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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk
Taxpayers who are subject to the risk of sustaining losses by embezzlement 
must be able to trace such losses to the years in which they take place if such 
losses are to be deducted as “losses sustained during the taxable year and not 
compensated for by insurance or otherwise, if incurred in trade or business.” 
If the embezzler, however, misappropriates funds of the taxpayer’s clients and 
the taxpayer opens an account with the embezzler at the time the fraud is 
discovered, and the account is found to be uncollectable, then the taxpayer may 
deduct the amount of the uncollectable account in the year he determines that 
it is uncollectable.
Such is the inference that may be drawn from a decision made by the United 
States court of appeals, eighth circuit, in the case of John H. Farish and Co, v. 
Commissioner of internal revenue.
It appears from the record that the taxpayer’s business principally consisted 
of collecting rents for clients; that a trusted employee embezzled $57,000 of 
funds collected from the taxpayer’s clients and was called upon to make good 
the defalcations; that upon the discovery that only about $6,000 of the defalca­
tions could be restored the remaining $51,000 was charged off in the year in 
which the defalcation was discovered and the account was found to be worthless.
Accountants were engaged after the shortage was discovered and they found 
that $10,000 had been embezzled in 1919 and $10,000 in 1920. The remaining 
$37,000 had been misappropriated prior to 1919. Confronted with this condi­
tion, the revenue agents determined that the taxpayer was entitled to deduct 
$10,000 in each of the years 1919 and 1920, as losses sustained and not com­
pensated for in those years, but apparently no deduction was allowed for prior 
years, because it was not possible to prove just how much of the loss was sus­
tained in each of the previous years, or, perhaps, because the statute of limita­
tions had barred the redetermination and refund for years prior to 1919.
The court held that inasmuch as the embezzlement was of the taxpayer’s 
clients’ funds and the taxpayer had paid the clients the amounts found to be 
due to them, and as he had charged the amount so paid to the embezzler’s 
account, the amount of the loss became an account receivable. This account 
was later found to be uncollectable as to its major part, was charged off and 
deducted in the taxpayer's return, and the deduction was allowed by the court.
To the lay mind it seems inconceivable that such a loss was not allowed by 
the commissioner at first without question, for the following reasons:
1. The facts recited by the court were known to the commissioner, when the 
revenue agent reported on his findings.
2. There were precedents at that time which indicated that under such con­
ditions as were present in the case the loss was deductible as a bad debt.
The apparent obstinacy of the bureau of internal revenue seems unjustifiable. 
The pursuance of such a policy placed on this taxpayer the hardship and ex­
pense of employing counsel and the additional incidental costs of litigation. 
It is doubtful whether the taxpaying citizens expect the government to go to 
such lengths in pursuing a few stray tax dollars, and the treasury department’s 
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more recent policy of meeting a taxpayer halfway in the settlement of such 
controversies, we believe, grew out of a realization that a victory in such cases 
as the one under consideration reflected no credit on the government nor on 
those responsible for such victories.
SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
Depletion and depreciation deductions on the unit-of-production basis for 
1918 and 1920 on coal-mining properties may not be based on a new and cor­
rected estimate of recoverable coal made in 1922, which new estimate may be 
used as a basis only for taxable years after the estimate was made. (Kehota 
Mining Co. v. C. G. Lewellyn, former collector, and Kehota Mining Co. v. D. B. 
Heiner, collector. U. S. circuit court of appeals, third circuit.)
Gain from the sale by the trustee of securities, part of a residuary trust fund 
bequeathed, after a life estate, to exempt charitable, etc., institutions, is 
exempt if such income is permanently set aside for payment to such institutions 
or if, by the terms of the will, the income is to be payable to charitable uses, 
and such income may not be taxed even though the trustee has power to 
divert it to non-exempt fields, until such actual diversion is made. (The Hart­
ford-Connecticut Trust Co., trustee of the estate of Frank C. Sumner, v. Robert 
O. Eaton, collector. U. S. district court, district of Connecticut.)
The statutory basis under the 1921 act for sale of trust property by the 
trustee should be adjusted for depreciation sustained whether or not such 
depreciation was deducted in the return for the trust. (Old Colony Trust Co. 
v. White. District court of the United States, district of Massachusetts.)
No deductible loss was sustained in the amount of the excess of the cost of 
rebuilding in 1920 a unit of a lumbering plant destroyed by fire in 1919 and the 
amount of insurance collected therefor. (Pelican Bay Lumber Co. v. David 
H. Blair, commissioner. U. S. circuit court of appeals, ninth circuit.)
Debt resulting where a bank was compelled to make good a letter of credit 
issued upon an irrevocable guaranty by another bank covering a purchase by a 
customer of the latter, which the latter revoked and the former refused to 
accept, charged off in 1920, was held not to have been ascertained to be worth­
less within the taxable year, where the guarantor was a going banking concern 
not shown to be insolvent in any sense of the term, and the taxpayer brought 
suit against it shortly after the charge-off. (American Trust Company, succes­
sor to American National Bank, v. Commissioner. U. S. circuit court of appeals, 
ninth circuit.)
Where the accrual basis upon which a corporation kept its books admittedly 
did not reflect true net income as used in a return under the option provided in 
sec. 13 (d), act of 1917, in that an item of inventory otherwise valued at cost or 
market, whichever was lower, was valued at a constant figure regardless of 
changes in cost or market value, income for 1917 must be computed on the 
cash-receipts-and-disbursements basis. (American Can Co. v. United States; 
Detroit Can Co. v. United States; Missouri Can Co. v. United States. U. S. 
court of appeals, third circuit.)
Loss from embezzlement over a period of years by an employee of the tax­
payer in the business principally of collecting rents for clients is deductible as a 
bad debt in the year the employer was called upon to make good the defalca­
tions and the amount was charged off upon determining that recovery could not 
be made from the employee, the money embezzled being trust funds belonging 
to the taxpayer’s clients. (John H. Farish and Co. v. Commissioner. U. S. 
circuit court of appeals, eighth circuit.)
A hotel serving tea in its public rooms and furnishing music for dancing 
without charge of any kind for dancing, is not subject to the tax imposed on 
roof gardens, cabarets or other similar entertainment by sec. 800 of the 1918 
and 1921 acts. (The United States of America v. The Broadmoor Hotel Co., a 
corporation. U. S. district court, district of Colorado.)
Intangibles consisting of trade marks, trade names, trade brands and good­
will are not such property as is subject to obsolescence within the meaning of 
sec. 214 (a) (8), acts of 1918 and 1921.
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Profit from the sale of old whiskey sold by a distiller in 1922 is not subject to 
the capital-gain provision of sec. 206, act of 1921, such property being stock in 
trade properly included in inventory.
A distillery plant became obsolescent in 1921 when the Willis-Campbell act 
became effective and a permit to distill medicinal whiskey was refused, and 
obsolescence and depreciation should be allowed on warehouses in propor­
tion to the reduction in useful and valuable capacity during each year. That 
a permit to distill medicinal whiskey may be issued at some future time is a 
hypothetical assumption contrary to fact. (Frederick C. Renziehausen v. 
Commissioner; Commissioner v. Frederick C. Renziehausen. U. S. circuit court 
of appeals, third circuit.)
Two corporations were held not to be affiliated for 1920, the ownership by 
one company of 80% of the stock of the other not constituting ownership or 
control of substantially all its stock. (Wadhams & Co. v. The United States. 
Court of claims of the U. S.)
Profit from the sale in 1917 of realty acquired in 1915 by a corporation or­
ganized in that year to acquire the assets of two railway companies by the issue 
of its capital stock dollar for dollar for the outstanding stock of the predecessor 
corporations was determined on the basis of the value of such realty carried on 
the books which was the original cost price to the predecessor corporation. 
{Seaboard Air Line Railway Company v. United States. Court of claims of 
the United States.)
Amounts charged in 1920 to the chief stockholders of a corporation repre­
senting the balance of a contract which had proved worthless transferred by 
such stockholders to the corporation in exchange for stock, constitute contribu­
tions of capital and are not deductible by the stockholders either as a loss or as a 
reduction in salary, as claimed by the taxpayers. (Warren E. Burns, Williard 
A. Walsh & Carl Schaetzer v. Commissioner. U. S. circuit court of appeals, 
fifth circuit.)
A valid and completed gift of stock by the decedent to his wife over two 
years prior to his death in 1921 was consummated, no part of which should be 
included in the decedent’s gross estate, the court holding that the decedent in­
tended to do whatever was necessary to complete the gift to his wife, and made 
sufficient delivery effectually to pass legal title where the transfers were re­
corded on the corporate books and new certificates issued in the wife’s name, 
part of which certificates were substituted for the old certificates of stock used 
as collateral by banks and the balance placed in the decedent’s safe-deposit box 
to which the agent of his wife had access. That the wife had given to the dece­
dent, prior to the transfers, power of attorney to sign or endorse the stock and 
to negotiate purchase and sale thereof, which power the decedent never exer­
cised, or that the income thereof was used in the payment of the household 
expenses and for maintenance of a yacht, under powers of attorney, does not 
establish that the decedent did not part with dominion and control over the 
stock. (Norman W. Bingham, jr., et als., executors of the will of King Upton v. 
Thomas W. White, collector. District court of the U. S., district of Massa­
chusetts.)
Share of 1919 profits credited to a salesman in addition to a salary on the 
books of a corporation under a contract to share profits and losses during the 
contract upon an accounting at the termination of the contract, which was 
terminated in 1921 when the losses exceeded the profits, is not deductible in 
1919, since under the terms of the contract the corporation never actually 
became liable for any amount of profits. (United States of America v. Block & 
Kohner Mercantile Co., a corporation. U. S. district court, eastern division of 
the eastern judicial district of Missouri.)
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